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In

The Supreme Gourt
of the

State of Utah
ST.A. TE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff and Respondent
vs.

FRANK R. HILL,
Defendant and Appellrutt.

·BRIEF OF

APPEl~LANT

PROCEEDINGS UP TO THE TIME

0~.,

TRIAL

In October, 1939, complaint was filed before a
justice of the peace at D·elta, 1\tlilla.rd County, Utah,
charging the defendant with a felony. The com..
plaint alleged that on the 31st of July, 1939, the
defendant ''did obtain 112,905 pounds of alfalfa hay
of the value of $536.30 from Dudley and ~e·ed
Crafts by means of false ·pretenses.'' (See Judgment R.oll, p. 1).
A preliminary he·aring 'vas had and on 10ctober 2·6,
1939, defendant was bound over to the D'istrict
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Court for trial. Mr. W. R. ·Walker, a layman, represented the defendant at this hearing. ( J. R. 4).
An information in the exact language o.f the complaint was filed January 2·2, 1940. (J. R. 6). The
defendant filed a motion to quash the information
on the following grounds:
(1) That the information did not state
facts suffi.cicnt to constitute a public
offense;
(2) · Th~t no tacts were set forth in the information from 'vhich the defendant could
determine with what he was cha.rg~ed;

(3) That the information did not comply
with the provisions of
Article I, Section XII of the Constitution
of Utah;
( 4) That it did not set forth facts sufficient to enable the defendant to properly
defend the action ;
(5) That it did not comply with
Sec. 105-11-1, R. S. Utah, 1933;
(6) That more than one offense was
attempted to he charged;
(7) That the language of the information "by means of false pretenses" was
uncertain, indefinite and did not app~rise
the defendant of anything. The defendant
demurred to the information upon the same
grounds. ( J. R. 9
1
).

Without waiving the motion to quash, demand for
a bill of particulars waSAiduly made (J. R. 10). The
bill of particulars was filed February 23, 1940. It
a.lleg1ed that on or about July 31, 1939, at Delta,
Millard County, Utah, the complaining witness,
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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Dudley Crafts, had a conversation· with the defendant and that Crafts asked the defendant, ''Have
you enough credits coming' in to take care of your
debts, because if you hnyen 't 1 vvill not sell you
the hay!" and that Hill replied that he had sufficient credits due to pny all bills and the anlolmt due
Crafts for the hay then about to be purchased; that
upon that representation Crafts sold the defendant
the ihay; that the statement of defendant was fals;e
and untrue, which the defendant knew and that the
1
defendant was at the time insolvent (J. R. 12).
After the filing of this bill of p~articulars, a supplemental motion to quash the information was duly
made alleg"ing1 the same grounds that had been set
forth in the original motion; that the bill of P'articulars "~as insufficient, and that insufficient facts
were set forth to enable the defendant to properly
defend the action; that the facts stated did not constitute a public offense and that it could not be
ascertained upon what terms the hay mentioned
was sold, whether for cash or credit, and i~ on
credit what vvere the terms of payment. There was
also a motion to strike the bill of particulars upon
the same grounds as made in 'the motion. ·
The case had been duly set for trial for February
23, 1940, at 10:00 A. M. Arguments 'vere duly had
on the motions to quash, motions to strike and the
demurrer and the district attorney stated that he
'
'F'-'"11ld furnish a supplemental bill of particulars.,
''Thich was filed at 2:00 P. 1'[. of February 23d.
After the filing of this supplemental bill of p·articulars, it was agreed that the supplemental motion filed against the former b1ll of p~articulars
and information should be deemed to apply to the
infonnation as it stood 'vith the supplemental
bill of particulars filed. These motions vvere overruled.
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PROCEEDINGS HAD· AND EVIDENCE GIVEN
AT THE TRIAL.
A trial by jury was waived, a plea of not, guilty was
entered. (Tr. 6-7). Objection was. inade by the defendant to the introduction of any testimony on
the following grounds: (1) that the court had no
jurisdiction of the offense attempted to be alleged;
(2). that the information did not state a pubU(l
offense.
Over the objection of the defendant, the bill of particulars was amended by interlineation in the following particulars: ''that the above f::;tatements
\vere not made in writing, hut were made orally,"
and at the end of the information, the following was
added: "and that the said statements of the defendant \Vere made with the intent to cheat or defraud the said Dudley and Reed Crafts, '' ( J. R.
17).
The same objections were made· to the supplemental
bill of particulars as amended. These objections
were overruled, and the following proceedings werP
then had:
The State offered the following:
DUDLEY CRAFTS testified that in July, 1939 the
defendant was engaged in buying alfalfa hay and
grinding it; that on or about the 31st of Ju]y he
had a conversation over the telephone with the defendant regardin~ the sale of the hay; that the dP . .
fendant stated he wanted to buy a stack of hay, and
that hP (Crafts) replied that the hay belonged to
his brother Reed. That that same afternoon thP
witness went to Hill Bros. Milling Company and
told defendant that he had come do\vn to find out
just what th~ exact 'financial condition of the Hill
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Bros. Milling Company 'yas, before he could let him
have the hay; that the defendant said :
''Dudley, this time 've ar~ g-oing to tell you the
truth about it. · \\T e have got outstanding accounts,
good accounts, to pay every dollar we .owe. You
understand how it is, 'Ye send this stuff out over
the country to the poultrymen and stock markets;
they are slovr pay, but they are g-ood p1ay. We
al,vays get our money.''
Crafts replied that that was alJ;he wanted to know;
that if the company ha~;z;:tto pay for the hay,
if that was true, then they eould have it, and upon
that representation he and Reed Crafts s.old the
hay; that there was something over 50 tons, and
that the price was $536.00; the defendant asked if
it would be all right to pay for the hay in thirty
days, the first of September, and that Crafts said
yes, that would be all right (Tr. 11-12'); that within
the next two or three days the trucks 'vere sent
down and got the hay; that through legal proceedings he had received about $2'46.00. (Tr. 14) .
That the last business conducted by defendant at
Delta was on the 19th of October~ 1939; that at that
time a committee?- had been appointed to take over
the affairs of the company and this committee had p·aid some of the bills ow\ing
by the company, (Tr. 15); that in October,
1939 he had a conversation with the· defendant
as to the accounts receivable, and at that time defendant said the company (nved approximately
$22.000.00 and had no accounts receivable (Tr.17).

CROSS - EXA.lfiNATION:
On cross-examination. thP '\vitness testified that he
had hPPn selling hay to Hill Bros. l\filling Company
a corporation, since June, 1937; that the defendant
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waR vice-president and manager of the company;

that on July 31, 1939 l\1r. Hill "\vanted to buy ,some
hay for the company, and that he, the witness,
wanted to :find out the financial condition of the coinpany; that he asked Hill how the company stood,
and that Hill stated that the company had outstanding accounts to pay every dollar that it o·wed;
(Tr. 19) that Hill requested a thirty days' credit,
and stated that the company could pay ,for the hay
in thirty days; that it 'vas, because he had ;been led
i.o believe· that the eompany had enough' money to
pay every dollar it owed, that he sold the hay to
the company (Tr. 20); that Mr. I. N. Parker owned
half of the hay and that Reed Crafts owned a half;
that he (Crafts) waR selling it for them, but had no
interest in it (Tr. 21).
1

We also sold second crop. hay hut that was a different transaction. The hay involved here was sold
on thirty days credit.

''A. There was no payment made

:p~rior

to September on this becat-ise it -was not
due, he had two accounts, this "\vas on the
other account, this payment was n1ade on
the second crop.
Q. Was the second crop due 7
.A.. It was due when they got it.
Q. It was all on the first the credit was
extendedT

A. Yes.
Q. This credit was extended to the company on Mr. Hill's statement, as you have
stated?
A. That is true.

Q. How?
A.

That is true.
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'
Q. There is no question about that 1
A. There is no question about it.
Q. How!
A. No.

Q. On the repres-entation that he made as
to the financial condition of the company!
A. On the representation that he made
as to the financial condition of the company, that is true.''
Afterwards the committee took over the affairs of
the company, and Hill p·romised to turn over the
stock of the corporation, but never did it. Crafts
brought suit against the corporation on the very
account of the sale of this hay. The complaint
which is verified by him and the other pap,ers relating to it are on account of this hay. (These
pap·ers are mark8d Exhibit
and are :part of the
record).

a

Defendant's Exhibit 2, which 'vas received in evidence, consists of the summons, writ of attachment
and complaint, affidavit for attachme-nt and execution in the case of I. R. Parker v. Hill Bros..
Alfalfa Milling Company, a corporation. This \vas
a suit for the amouat due on the hay that it i~
claimed in this criminal proceeding \Vas obtained
by false pretenses. Tn~ hay; belong1ed to I. R.
Parker and Reed Crafts, and we brought a e1vil
suit for Parker's 'part of it. Mr. Parker never
assigned any of his claim to Reed Crafts and Reed
Crafts never assigned any part of hi$ to Mr.
Parker (Tr. 27).
:Defendant's Exhibit 1 is the statement rendered
to Reed and Dudley Crafts. showing the amount of
hay sold, payments made and the balance due.
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DARYL PEARSON testified that from ~Tu1y, 1938
to August of 1939 he worked for Hill Bros. Alfalfa
1\{illing Company, that he 'vas . the secretary and
treasurer of the company and also kept the books ;
that he made a financial statement to the board of
directors as of the month of June, 1939 err. 28);
that he got his information from the books of the
corporation. This rep~ort was marked plaintiff's
Exhibit A and was introduced in evidence over the
objection of ~the defendant. That as to the iten1s
machinery and equipment, building and land, hP
could not tell ho"\V they came to have the value that
was placed upon them (Tr. 3.2). That he left the
service of thee company August 20, 1939 ( Tr. 3.5) ;
that the financial condition of the company was
better by between six and eight hundred dollars
July 31st than it "\Vas June 30, 1939; that he was
in the office and heard the conversation between
Dudley Crafts and the defendant; that !\f.r. Crafts
wanted to know 'if the eompany was in ~ood con . .
dition, and Mr. Hill said that the company was;
tha.t Mr. Crafts said he did not want to sell the hay
to the comp·any unless he was sure he would get
his money (Tr. 42).
On cross ;examination, the witness testified tha.t
v1hen Dudley Crafts came to the office, he (Crafts)
wanted to know whether the business was in a condition where he wouldn't lose his money, that hP.
said he couldn't afford to lose· it and that 1\{r. I-Iill
stated that the company would be able to pay for
the hay in thirty da.ys ( Tr. 43).
DUDLEY CRAFTS was recalled and testified that
in Oetober of 1939 he told the defendant tha.t when
the defendant bought the- hay from him (Crafts),
the defendant lied to him, and that he knew he was
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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lying when he said they had enough money to p~ay
eyery bill they 0\Yed, and that the defendant said
yes, but that if he had not said that, Crafts would
not haYe sold him the hay (Tr. 45).

It was agreed that Mr. Rulon Hinckley,

~lr.

Frank

Roberts and Mr. Peter Gronning would testify substantially as Dudley Crafts had done as to this last
conversation of October, 1939.
The foregoing constitutes all the evidence received
at the trial
Thereupon the State and defendant rested.
'rhe defendant moved for a dismissal of the cas.e
because of a fatal variance as to the_ ownership of
the hay; also that there was no evidence offered
or given as to the solvency or insolvency of the
defendant; that there was no evidence offered or
given that the defendant was insolvent at the time
the hay was purchased, or at any other time; that
no evidence had been given whatever as to the
financial condition of the defendant· that the transaction appeared to he wholly with' the corporation of which the defendant was the manager (Tr.
47); that no evidence has been given which showed
or tended to show that the defendant was guilty.
The court refused to pass on this motion, refused
to decide the case and held that the evidence showed
that the hay belonged to Reed Crafts and I. R.
Parker and that Dudley Crafts had authority to
sell it; that there was no evidence as to the sol··
vency or insolvency of the defendant individually
(Tr. 48).
The court then stated that if the information referred to a rep~resentation as. to the financial condition of the corporation and that the hay 'vas sold
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to the corporation in reliance upon the financial
condition of the corporation, that evidence had been
offered to sustain such an information, but if the
information referred to a representation as to the
ability of the defe-ndant individually to pay for it,
'then there was no proof of the defendant's guilt;
that under the p~rovisions of
·Sees. 105-21-43 and 105-21-44, Laws of
Utah, 1935,
it would he proper to direct that the bill of parulars be amen9.ed, or that a new bill of particulars
be furnished which sets out the matters that the
court has referred to as being proved so there will
be no question as to the charge that is made against
the defendant:
That proof had been offered showing obtaining
property unde~ false p1retenses, but that the hill of
particulars is not definite enough and does not
properly cover the false pretenses 'v hich appears
have been proved; that the original bill of particulars referred to this statement of the defendant
\Vhich i_s alleged to have been a false pretense; that
the original bill stated that ''Hill replied that he
had sufficient credits to pay all hills and the amount
due Crafts for the hay;'' that the supplemental bill
of particulars refer:;; to a statement that ''we have
enough outstanding accounts to pay every dollar
that 've owe." The information is silent as to the
p.articulars of the offense so that it could refer to
a statement made as to the financial condition of the
c.ompany or the defendant individually.
He then ordered that the bill of particulars should
be amended to show the particulars of the offense
\vhich appeared to have been p~roven and that thP.
defendant could ask for a reopening of the cas,e
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so as to offer further evidence if he desired. To
all such rulings the defendant duly excepted (Tr.
50).
The court then directed that the bill of particula,rs
be amended to sho,v that on July 31, 19a9, Dudley
Crafts discussed '"ith the defendant the sale of hay
which belonged to R.eed Crafts and I. R. Parker, and
that Dudley Crafts in the conversation said, ''I
'Ya.nt to knovr "\Yhat your financial condition is before we let you have the hay,'' and that the defendant stated that the company was in good
financial condition and had outstanding accountS!
receivable sufficient to pay all of its liabilities, and
that the statement was false and was then known to
the defendant to be false, and that Dudlev Crafts
relied upon the statement being true and i~-- reliance
sold the hay in question (Tr. 51). The State was
allowed ten days in which to file this supplemental
bill of particulars and on March 4, 1940, filed the
said supplemental bill (J. R. 18).

PROCEEDINGS AFTER TRIAL
i\.fter,vards, the defendant 'vas directed to appear
hefore the col!_rt on . .t\.pril
.
9, 1940, "rhich he did. At
that time, the defendant again moved the court to
determine the case as it was at the time the State
and the defendant rested, towit, February 24, 1940,
and either declare the defendant ~lty or not
guilty. This the court refused to do ( J. R. 24;
Tr. 55). The court then asked the defendant. if he
desired to plead to the charge since the supplemental l:ill of pHrticulars was filed; the defendant
rrfnsed to plead, asserting there was no jurisdiction
to hear any matter or proceeding on any pretendec~
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charge s.et forth 'in the supplemental bill of particulars filed as of March 4, 1940 ( Tr. 56). The
court then stated that leave would be g;rru1ted to the
defendant to submit further evidence; the defendant stated that the court had already passed upon
the evidence and had made a· declaration into the
record that the defendan~ was guilty and that in
view of that statement, he felt it would he us.eless
to offer any evid~nce tn change the court's mind;
that the court had no power or authority to proceed under the supplemental bill of particulars filed
as of March 4, 1940; the court then found the defendant guilty under the supplemental hill of particulars filed as of March 4, 1940, and sent.encced
the defendap.t to from one to ten years in the State
Penitentiary ( J. R. 24; Tr. 57 -59).

ASSIGNME·N~rs

OF ERROR

The:.;-e are 24 assignments of error. 'J:he first six
relate to the rulings of tne court upholding the information and the bills of particulars. Assignments 7 to 17, each inclusive, relate to the admission of evidence. Assignment 18 relates to the refusal of the court to dismiss the case because there
'\Yas no proof offered as to the guilt of the defendant. Assignments 19 and 21 relate to the supplemental bill of ~particulars filed March 4, 1940. No.
20 relateS' to the refusal of the court to decide the
ease upon the issues upon which th~ case vvas tried.
Assignments 22 to 24, each inclusive, relate to the
court's finding the defendant guilty and in sentencing the defendant to the State prison.

We will first discuss assigments 18, 20, 21, 22, 23
and 24.
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ARGUMENT
I
The complaint upon which the defendant was
bound over to the District Court and the information upon "~hich he \Yas tried were based on

Sec. 103-18-8, R. S. Utah, 1933
The information did not set forth what the false
pretenses "~ere. The bill of p~a,rticulars filed February 23, 1940 ( J. R. 12) set forth that at the time
and place in question in answer to the question p~ut
by the complaining .witness ''Have you enough
credits comingw in to take_ care of your debts'''
that the defendant repJied that he had sufficient
credits due to pay all bills and the amount due
Crafts for the hay then about to be p~urchased.
The supplemental bill of particulars which waH
filed February 23, 1940 ( J. R. 17) is practically to
the same effect, stating that a.t the time and p~lacA
in question Crafts said to the defendant, ''I want
to know just what your financial condition is before we let you have the hay,'' and tha.t he could
not let the defendant have the hay unless their
financial condition was such tha.t they were sur~
to get their money, to which the defendant replied,
"This time, Dudley, we are going to tell you th~·
truth about it. The fact is, we have enough outstanding accounts to pay every dollar we ow~~'"
Upon the information, the hill of particulars and
the supplemental bill of particulars the trial \vas
had. The evidence in support of those alle.e:ation~
has heretofore been set forth in considerable detail. Suffice it to Ray that on the day in question
Mr. Crafts agreed to sell to Hill Brothers Alfalfa
Milling Co. th~ hay in question; that Mr. Hill
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as manager of the corporation, agreed to and did
purchase it with the understanding that the company \vould be allowed thirty days in V\ hich to make
payment; that Mr. Hill told Mr~ Crafts that the
company had outstanding accounts sufficient to pav
for the hay within thirty days.. In other vrords, the
hay 'Yas sold to the company upon the agree1nent
and understanding that the comp~any would pay for
it within thirty days. Although the information,
aided if it could be by the bills of particulars filed
February 23, 1940, charg~d the defendant with
representing that he "\vas financially able to pay
for the hay, not a scintilla of evidence 'vas offered
a.s t.o the financial s~anding} ability or condition of
the defendant.
7

There was no evidence of any kind what the financial standing of the defendant was; whether he was
solvent or insolvent, affluent or penniless., wealthy
or poverty-stricken, was not diselosed. Even the
court, determined as he was to punish the defendant, said at the conclus.sion of the evidence, that ''it
further appears to the court that there is no evidence as to the solvency or insolvency of the defenda.nt." (Tr. 48).
·
The issue to be determined by the court was wbethelthe repres·entation alleged to have been made by
the defendant as to his solvency \vas true or not
true; that was the issue which was tried. The State
had alleged that the defendant obtained the bay
upon the pretense that he, defend~nt, "ras solvent,
whereas in truth and in fact the defendant \vas 1nsolvent and that the representation he 1nade as to
his solvency was untrue.
There was a complete failure of proof. The State
utterly failed to prove the charge against. th~ deSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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fendant, failed to p-rove that he made any rep·re~..
sentation as to his financial condition, failed to
prove 'vha.t his financial eondition was. 'rhe court,
having found, as he did, that there was no evidence as to the solvency or insolvency of the defendant, should have immediately found him not
g'"uilty and discharged the defendant. h1stead, the
court appeared determined to find him guilty of a
charge upon ·~vhich he had never been bound over
to the District Court, upon which no issue ha.d been
made or trial had. 'rhe court apparently either did
not understand what a failure of ·proof was, or confused failure of proof 'vith an immaterial variance.
The court app·arently believed that under
Subdivision 2 of Sec. 105-21-43, L.a·ws of
Utah, 1935,
he could order a bill of p-articulars amended to conform to whatever evidence wa.s given. He took the
view that even though there was a complete failure
of proof as to the crime charged, that there "\Vas
evidence as to some other crime·, and therefore he
could order a bill of p,articula.rs filed that would
cover the case made by the evidence, and that the
defendant could not complain. The court's. theory
seemed to be that if A was charged with the murder
of B and a trial was had upon that issue and the
evidence showed that instead of committing murrler, A had burned do\Vn the house of 0, that the
State could after trial file a bill of particulars settjng forth that A had burned C 's hous,e down and
that the defendant could then he· found guilty of
arson.
To the court's mind the original com-plain( the
original information and the original bill of- particulars '\vhich attE:-mpted to explain, elucidate and
clarify the information, '""ere of no consequence. All
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the court seemed to be concerned with was what
did the evidence show, and even though the evidenee showed an entirely different offense from
that charged, a bill of particulars after the case had
been closed would cover the defect and justice had
been done. A most novel p,roceeding, to say the
least. If such were the purpose and intent· of the
so~called ''reformed procedure,'' let us hop~e and
pray that no more reformations are attempted.
The court apparently overlooked
Sec. 104-14-2, · R. S. Utah, 1933, which
provides,:
''Where, however, the allegation of the
cl~im or defense to which the vroof is
directed is unproved, not in some particular or particulars only but in its general
&cop~e and meaning, it is not to be deemed
a case of variance, but a failure of proof.''
That statute is directly app~licable to the cage at
bar. The allega.tions made ·by the State were unproved. They were unproved in their g1eneral scope
and meaning. There was a comp~lete failure of
proof The court should have discharged the defendant.
The purchase of goods on the p:r;omise to pay i:n
the future is not a fal8e p.retense. A false pretense
is a misrepresentation as to an existing fact or
past event, and not a mere promise to do something
in the future or a misrepresentatjon as to some--thing to take ·place in the future. See
People v. Green, (Cal.), 133
Taylor v. Territory, (Old.), 99
State v. Leonard, (Ore.), 144
State v. I..ts·nn, ('Wash.), 154
Jacobson v. State, (Ariz.), 209

Pac.
Pac.
Pac.
Pac.
Pac.

334.
628.
113.
79Ft
310.
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,,~illis

State, (Ariz.),
People v. Moore, (Cal.)
People v. ''11ite, (Cal.),
People Y. Orris, (Colo.),
Huckaby v. State, (Okl.),
Y.

271
256
259
121
211

Pac.
Pac.
Pac.
P·ac.
Pac.

725.
266.
76.

163.
525.

In State v. Ho\Yd, 56 Utah 527,
the Supreme Court of this State followed the principJe announced in the above cases. In that case
the Court held that the representation fi·y the buyer
of cattle that he would pay therefor on their arrival,
though made \Yithout intention to pay, was not a
fraudulent representation or false pretense in the
legal acceptance of the terms.
''Elements of Offense Charged. Since the
accused can be legally convicted only of
the offenge eharged in the indictment or
information, it is apparent that the evidence adduced must be in conformity with
and be sufficient to sustain the material
elements of the crime alleged. Proof of a
different offense than that laid in ~he plead-ing would be fatal to the prosecution and
must necessarily result in an acquittal.''
25 Cyc. of Proeedure 552, and cases there

cited.
ThiR principle is so \vell established in the law that
further citations are unnecessary.

The court \\Tas in error in holding that some crime
had been comntitted. An examination of the evidence- shows that the defendant was guilty of no
erime whatsoever. If we assume that the defendant
misrepresented the financial condition of Hill Bros.
Alfalfa Milling Company, of 'vhich he "\vas manager,
nnd had obtained the hay in question upon that misSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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representation, still he did not commit any offense.
The representation made by the defendant was
that the company had sufficient outstanding
accounts "\vhich ~ould be collected and the hay paid
for "Within thirty days. In other words, the defendant purchased the hay 'vith the understanding
and agreement that it would be p~aid for within
thirty days. The agreement was oral. No written
representation as to the financial condition of the
company was made.
Sec. 103-18-9, R. S. lJ tah 1933,
provides in effect that where one obtains credit by
a false representation in "rriting resp·ecting the
financial condition or ability of himself or those
for whom he is a.cting, to pay, he is guilty of a misdemeanor. It necessarily follows that unless the
false rep,resentation is written, no offense is committed.

II.
ASSIGNMENT

0~-,

ERROR NO. 19

This assignment relates to the error of the court
in directing the State to file a suppJemental bill of
particulars after the case had been tried and submitted.
We will briefly summarize the record under this
assignment. The complaint before the justice of
the peace ·'charged the deifenda,nt 'vit.li obtabiing
by false pretenses hay belonging to Dudley and
Reed Crafts, the false pretense being that the defendant had represented that he was solvent, when
in fact he was insolvent. The information was
identical with the complaint. The bill of particulars and the supplemental bill of particulars, both
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filed February 23, 1940, detailed the false rep,resentntions alleged to have been made. Instead of
proving the case as alleged, the State proved that
the hay belonged to Reed Crafts and I. R. P'arker,
and that it 'ya.s purchased by defendant for Hill
Bros. Alfalfa ~filling Company upon 30-days'
credit.
At the conclusion of the evidence and after both
the State and defendant had rested, the defendant
requested the court to dismiss the case and find
the defendant not guilty because there was no evidence which tended to show that the defendant was
guilty of any crime whatsoever. Instead of de·
ciding the case as tried and either finding the de ..
fpndant guilty or not guilty of the crime attempted
to be charged in the information, the court directed
the district attorney to file within ten days. a sup-plemental bill of particulars alle~ng· that. the defendant had obtained hay by false p~retenses from
I. R. Parker and Reed Crafts, the false pretens,es
being that the defendant had misrepresented the
financial condition of Hill Bros. Alfalfa MilHng
Company.
At the threshold of the inquiry we are met with
three questions : Is a bill of particulars in a criminal case superior and paramount to the information~ Can a bill o{ ptarticulars give a court jurisdiction to determine the guilt or innocence of a. defendant of a crime upon which no pTeliminary exan1ination has ever been waived or had and upon
which no information has ever heen filed~ When
the evidence discloses that the offense for which
the defendant has been hound over to the District
Court and upon \Vhich an information has bePn
filed, has not been committed, does the court4 because he erroneously supposes that so1ne other
offense has been comn1i tted, have jurisdiction to
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order the filing of a bill of p~articulars to cover the
supposed. offense, and then declare the defendant
guilty of the supposed offense and sentence him
not to a supposed, but to a real p·enitentiary~
\Vhat need is there of a complaint before the justice
of the peace, a p,reliminary examination on tliat
complaint, the filing of an information and a trial
upon that information, if they are to be superseded
by a bill of particulars charging an entirely new and
distinct offense~ Asking' the question, answers it.
The trial court was not clear as to the correctness
of the proceeding which he adopted. He allowed
the State ten days in \vhich to file the sup·plemental
bill of particulars ; he thereafter ordered the defendant brought before him to p~lead to that supplemental hill of particulars. Pause for one moment. The information and two bills of particulars
had been filed 7 the defendant had been tried and
had moved for a dismissal of the case, moved to
have the case determined upon the issues upon
which it had been tried; instead. of decidin~ thP
case, the court ordered a supplemental bill of par.ticulars filed and gave. the Sta.te ten days in which
to file it.
This supplemental bill of particulars was filed on
March 4, 1940, and afterwards and in tl?-e month of
April the defendant was directed to appear heforP.
the court for further p~roceedings 1tnder that supplem.ent.rrl bill o.f particu.l ars. He d1d appear on
April 9, 1940, and was requested by the court to
plead to that s11pplemental bill of particulars. Not'vithstanding that th~ defendant had entered a plea
;of not gu'ilty to the offense alleged in the inforlnation, and notwithstanding he had been tried urider
that information, and not"rithstanding that both
parties had r~sted, the court desired the defendSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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ant to plead a.ne'v to the supplemental bill of 'P'ar·ieulars \Yhieh he, the court, had ordered filed.
'Yhen the de~endant refused to ple-ad, the court announced that h~ 'Yould entertain an application on
the part of the defendant to reopen the case and
present further eYidence if the defendant desirea.
What eould it avail the defendant to offer evidence in vie"'" of the fact that the court had already
pronounced him guilty of the offense~ Was the
defendant expected to p·rove his innocence~ Did
the court desire the defendant to introduce evidence to change the eourt 's opinion~ In view of the
rulings of the court and the decision that he had
already made, it would have been a Herculean task
to change the mind of the court. The labor of
Sisyphus \vas easy compared to what the court, was
asking.
The holding by the trial court that a bill of particulars is sup·erior to and supplants the information
\vas clearly error. This Court held in
State v. Solomon, 93 Utah 70; 71 Pac. (2d)
104,
that the bill of partieulars was no 'part of the information. In
State v. Jessop, 100 Pac. (2d) 969,
this Court held that in a criminal prosecution the
function of a bill of particulars is not that of compelling the defendants to aid the prosecution in
stating a cause of action. The authorities are uniform that the office of a bill of particulars is to inform the defendant what the State expects to
prove, and is no part of t.he information.
Schaumloeffel v. State, 62 Atl. 803, 804;
102 Md. 470.
Clary v. Commonwealth, 173 S. W. 171, 173;
163 Ky. 48.
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In United States v. Gouled, 253 Fed. 239,
it is held that the office of a hill of particulars is
to advise the court, and more particularly the defendant, of "\Vhat facts he will he required to meet,
and when a hill of particulars is made and served,
it concludes the rights of all parties and the p·rosecution must be confined to the p'articulars spec1..
fied. See also
State v. Harness, 238 N. W. 430.
Instead of applying the principles of law as laid
down in the above cases, the court apparently took
the view that a hill of particulars supersedes and
supplants the information, and gives the court
jurisdiction of the person and offense described in
that bill of particulars, ·even though no preliminary hearing had been held on the offense described therein and no inforn1ation filed thereon.
The supp,lemental bill of particulars 'vhich the court
ordered filed as of 1\{arch 4, 1940, "\Vas a nullity.
The court had no authority to order it filed, and the
filing of it did not vest the court V\rith any po\ver
or authority to take any action under it. The supplemental bill of particulars describes an entirely
different offense from that "\vhich is .pretended to
be set forth in the original com~pla.int and information. It attemp~ts to describe one offense, the information another. Assume that. the defendant
should again he charged with the offense set forth
in his original complaint and the in-formation filed
thereon; as a defense to that action, could he plead
that he had been once in je~p~ardy and hed been found
guilty, and as evidence of former jeopardy set up
the conviction under that supplemental bill of particulars~ If the State should desire to retry the
rlefendant on the charge that he had obtained hay
from Dudley and Reed Crafts hy falsely rep~reSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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senting his financial condition, vvould a plea of once
111 jeopardy lie, and would that plea he sustained
by the defendant's sho"\Ying that he had been conYicted of obtaining hay fron1 Reed Crafts and I. R.
Parker by falsely representing the condition of Hill
Bros. Alfalfa 1\!illing Company~ The question
illustrates very clearly the error of the court in
directing the supp~lemental hill of particulars to be
filed. The court seemed to have one thing in mind
only, and that \vas hy what method could he find
the defendant guilty of some offense. Although
the court 'vas perfectly satisfied that the offense
alleged in the information had not been proven, he
,,~as determined that the defendant should be found
guilty of something:, even though that something
was entirely distinct and apart from the offense for
'\vhic~ the defendant had been charged and for
which he had been tried. The court justified his
::.ction under the reformed p.rocedure. How this
Court can sustain the lower eourt under the reformed plrocedure or any other p·rocedure we are
at a loss to understand. The action of the trial
court can only be sustained by dis,regarding fundamental p.rinciples of law and wiping out sacred
safeguards which have come down through the ages
for the protection of individual rights.
The reasoning of the court in directin~ a supplemental bill of p~articulars to hP filed is. most unique.
The court, after finding that there was no evidence
as to the solvency or insolvency of the defendant
individually, said:
"It therefore appears that if the information in this case referred to a rep·resenta.tion as to the fin an rial condition of the
corporation and that the hay was sold to
the corporation in reliance upon the corporation being in good financial condiSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

tion or able to pay all of its then outstanding accounts, that the information is sustained by the proofs offered. But if the
information refers to a representation as
to the ability of the defendant individually
to pay for it, then there is no proof." (Tr.
48).
The court then s.aid it would he proper under the
provisions of
·Sec. 105-21-43 and 105-21-44
to direct that the bill of particulars be amended, or
tha.t a new bill of partie.ulars be furnished which
sets out the matters that the court had referred to
as being proved so that there would be no question
as to the charge that is made against the defend- .
ant; that proof had been of~ered showing obtaining
property under false pretenses,
''but that the bill of particulars (under
which the case was tried) is not definite
enough and does not prop·erly cover the
false p.retenses \Vhich it appears have been
proved . . . . the info·rmation is silent as
to the particulars of the offense, so that
it c:ould refer to a statement made as to
· the financial condition of the eompany or
the defendant individually." (Tr. 49).
'rhe court thus disregarded both bills of particulars '\Vhich had theretofore been filed and both
of which set forth the. false representations as be~
ing that of the ability of the individual to pay.
They were of no more consequence to the court.
If the information was as dup,liciJous as the court
indicated it was, and that under it proof could be
made as fo the financial ability of the defendant to
pay or the financial ability of the corporation to
pay, just as the State sa-\v fit, then he should have
sustained the motion to quash.
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m.
ASSIGNniENTS 1 TO

o

Assignn1ents of error 1 to 6, each inclusive, relate
to the rulings of the trial court in overruling the
motion to quash the information and in refusing to
quash the bills of particulars filed ],ebrua.ry 23,
1940, and in overruling the defendant's objection
to the introduction of evidf~nce because the court
did not have jurisdiction of the offenBe pretended
to be charged, and in permitting the State to amend
the first bill of particulars after the trial had bPgun (Tr. 2 to 9; J. R. 20).
The defendant insisted before the trial court that
the complaint before the justice of the p~eace did
not state a public offense, also that the information did not state a p~ublic offense. The defendant
still insists that no offense is sta~d either in the
comp~laint before the justice of the peace nor in the
information filed in the District Court. The mformation is under the so-called ''Reformed Procedure,'' but the reformed procedure cannot change
the fundamental law. Any statute changing the
fundamental law is clearly unconstitutional.
A bill of particulars cannot be used to aid the in·fonnation in stating a public offense~
~rticle

I, Section XIII of the Constitution

of Utah,
provides that offenses which had theretofore been
prosecuted by indictment shall be prosecuted by
information after examination and com1nitment by
a magistrate. Information, as used in the Constitution at the time it 'vas ado·pted, means an accusation in writing in form and substance like an indictment for the same offense, charging a person
with a public offense. Sep
Sec. 4606, R·. S. Utah 1898.
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Under Article I, Section XII of the Constitution of Utah,
·an accused is guaranteed the right to demand the
nature and cause of the accusation against him and
to have a copy thereof. The information must be
in such detail as will furnish the accused with a.
description of the charge :against him sufficient to
enable him to make a defense. it must be suffi' .
ciently specific to avail him of the right upon conviction or acquittal to p-rotect him against a fur ..
ther prosecution for the same offense.
As heretofore referred to, the
Constitution of Utah, Article I, Section XII,
provides that the accused shall have the right to
demand the nature and cause of the accusation
against him and to have a copy thereof.
The Con8titution of the United States,
Amendment VI,
·provides. that the accus,ed has the right "to he informed of the nature and cause of the accusation''
ag1ainst him.
It is seen that the two Co~titutional provisions are
almost identical. This language has been frequently construed by the Supreme Court and Federal
CourtS' of the United States to mean that the indictment, here the information, must set forth the
offense With clearness and all necessary certainty
to apprise the accus.ed of the crfme 'vith which hPstands charged, and that every ingredient of which
the offense is composed must he accurately and
clearly alleged. The cases so holding have been
heretofore cited.
It is very clear that a bill of particulars is no part
of· an indictment or information.
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State v. Solomon, 93 Utah 70; 71 Pac.
{2d) 104
State v. Jessop, (Utah). 100 Pac. (2d) 969.
Wright y. People, (Colo.), 91 Pac. ( 2d) 499.
People Y. ''restrup,, (Ill.), 25 N. E. (2d) 16.
United ·states v. Lynch, 11 Fed. (2d) 298.
Jarl v. U. S., 19 Fed. (2d) 891.
State v. Gilbert, (N. H.), 194 Atl. 728.
United States v. Tubbs. 94 Fed. 356.
This naturally follows from the well known maxim
that what is required to appear of record must be
shown by the record a.nd by the right record. Hence,
when the Constitution provides, as heretofore referred to, that the accused has the right to demand
the nature and cause of the accusation against him,
'vhich, under similar prrovisions of the Cons,titution
of the United States has so frequently heen construed to mean, that the indictment or information
itself must contain with clearness and certainty
every ingredient of \vhich the offense is composed.
it needs no argument to show that the legislature
may not p,rovide that such ingredients may be
stated or furnished by a bill of particulars, or by
some other document, or by some other method
other than or different from a cornp1iance with fhe
Constitutional provision. It is no doubt contended
by the State that in view of
Chap. 21, Sec. 105-21-9, Laws 1935,
that whatever defect there may be in an information
or indictment in not sufficiently stating the offense
therein, may be cured or avoided by a bill of particulars, which section p,rovides that \vhen an information or indictment charges an offense· in
accordanr~ ·w·ith the provisions of
Sec. 105-21-8,
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but fails to inform the defendant of the particulars
of the offense sufficiently to enable him to prepare
his defense or give- him such inform-ation as he is
entitled to under the Constitution of this /]tate. the
court may require or direct the prosecuting attorney to furnish the defendant a bill of particulars.
The cases heretofore cited and referred to, and especially the case of
Goldberg v. United States, 277 Fed. 211.
that the facts must be set forth in the--indictment
or information which the pleader claims constitute
the alleged transgressions so distinctly as to advise the a.ccus.ed of the charge which he has. to meet
and to give him a fair opportunity to prepare his
defense, and to enable the court to determine
u;hether the facts as there sta.ted are suffic-ient ta
supp-ort ,a conviction, and that the facts as 80 stated
may enable the accused to avail himself of a con:viction or acquittal in defense of another prosecution for the same offense.
State v. McKenna, 24 Utah 317; 67 Pac. 815.
State v. Topham, 41 Utah 39; 123 Pa.c. 888.
Statf.' v. Gesas., 49 Utah 181; 162 Pac. 366.
_State- v. Steele, 67 Utah 1; 245 Pac. 332.
State v. Hale, (Utah), 263 Pac. 86
State v. IJund, 75 Utah 559; 286 Pac. 960.
Lynch v. United States, 10 Fed. (2d) 947.
Goldberg v. United States, 277 Fed. 211.
United States v. Hess, 124 U. S. 483; 8 S.
Ct. 571; 31 L. Ed. 516
.Armour Packing Co. v. United States, 153
Fed. 1; 82 C. c.· A. 135; 14 L. R. A .
(N. S.) 400.
Floren v. United States, 186 Fed. 961; 108
C. C. A. 577.
Miller v. United States, 133 Fed. 337, 341 ~
66 C. C. A. 399, 403.
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

29

Naftzger v. United States, 200 Fed. 494.
50:2; 118 C. C. A. 598~ 604.
United States v. Britton, 107 U. S. 665:
2 Sup. Ct. 512; 27 L. Ed. 520~
Etheredg'e v. United States, 186 :B,ed. 434;
108 c. c. A. 356.
Winters v. United States, 201 Fed. 845, 848;
1:20 C. C. .l\.. 175, 189.
Horn v. United States, 182 Fed. 721; 105
C. C. A. 163, 167.
Fontana v. United States, 262 :B..,ed. 283.
United States v. Cruikshank, 92 U. S. 542;
23 L. Ed. 588.
Where the statute itself directly and sufficiently
prescribes the ingredients of the offense, an information or an indictment in the language of tha
statute ordinarily is a sufficient compliance with
the Constitutional provision. But where the statute defines the offense only in generic terms, then
to satisfy the Constitutional p·rovision, the information or indictment must go further in stating thP·
offense than by merely using the language of 'the
statute, and in which case, the information or indictment muRt descend to the particulars and to a
statement of all of the elements and ingredients of
the offense.
State v. Jessop,; supra, and other cases
heretofore cited.
By the provision of the code of criminal procedure
as provided by Session La,vs, 1935, and by
Sec. 105-21-47,
short forms of informations and indictments e:tre
specified. Among other things, it is there p1rovided
that an information charging murder is sufticient
merely to state that '' AB murdered CD,'' without
stating anything else as to time, place or means of
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the commission of the offense, or any of the ingredients of murder. So, too, charging that '' AB
embezzled $50.00 of CD'' was a sufficient charge
of embezzlement. That a charge, that "AB obtained an automobile from CD by means of false
pretenses,'' was a sufficient charge to constitute
the offense of falsp pretenses.
It is app·arent that such informations or indictments in no sense are a compliance V\rith the constitutional provision, that by the indictment or information itself, the accused is entitled to demand
the nature and cause of the accusation against him
\vhich, as heretofore shoV\rn and as a similar provision construed by the Supreme Court of the United
States, means that the information or indictment
itself must se~ forth the offense with clearness. \vith
nll necessary certainty as to every ingredient
constituting the offense. It is very clear that ~uch
an information or indictment as referred to in
Sec. 105-21-47, Laws of 1935,
does not give the accused such information as he is
entitled to under. the Constitution.
The question then is: l\Iay such information when
given by a bill of particulars constitute a compliance with the Constitutional provision~ If it be
considered and as detern1ined by the Supre1ne Cour1
of this State and in the cases heretofore cited, that
the bill of p·articulars is no part of the indictment
or information and can in no sense aid an information or indictment itself defective in not sufficiently stating• the ess~ntial elements and ingredients
of the offense, then it is. very clear that the information here, stated in mere generic terms and
charging merely as indicated by the short forn1 of
information as provided hy SeRsion Laws of 19~5,
is wholly insufficient and not in comp~liance ,with
the Constitutional provision.
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We recognize that in some jurisdictions it has been
held that a bill of particulars may aid an information or indictment, though defective in substance
as 'vell as in fonn. But under jurisdictions having
Constitutional provisions as in our Con8titution, as
to the requirements of an information or an indictment, the g-reat weight of authority is that an
information or indictment defective in substance
cannot be aided by a bill of particulars.. But whatever conflict there may be upon that question, we
think it :set at rest by the decisions of the Sup1reme
Court of this State, that a bill of particulars is no
part of an information or indictn1ent and tlence,
cannot aid an information or indictment which does
not comply with the requirements. of the Constitution.
However, in addition to all this and as heretofore
argued, the bill of particulars authorized and
directed by the court to be filed by the p~rosecuting
attorney after the case was tried and submitted for
decision, shows a statement of an offense wholly
separate and distinct from that charged in the infornlation. Let it be noticed that the court here did
not grant leave nor direct the prosecuting attorney
to file sn amended information in accordance with
the bill of particulars ordered and directed. And
had the court done so, it is very clear that the information could not be amended in such particular,
for to do so, would permit the information to be
amended as to a separate, independent and distinct offense, and it is clear that ,vhat is eharged in
the 'information and what is p·resented by the bill
of p,articulars in question, constitute two sep,arate
and distinct offenses.
In the next place, the accused is required to ·p,Iead
to an information or an indictment. He is. not required to plead to a bill of p·articulars. The court
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has no authority to require a plea of the accused
otherwise than to an indictment or information,
and when the court thus required the accused to
plead to the bill of particulars, the court clearly
transcended its authority. That is the effect of the
:holllin;..;· of this Court in the case of
State v. Solomon, sup~ra.
Lastly, by Laws of 1935 relating to the code of
criminal procedure and by
Sec. 105-23-3,
it is provided that a motion to quash is available,
among other things, and as stated in subdivision
(e) thereof,
''that it appears from a bill of particulars
fu~nished under the provisions of Sec.
105-21-9 that the ·particulars stated do not
constitute the offense charged in the information or indictment,''
etc., and as heretofore urged, the bill of particulars
ordered and directed by the court, after trial on the
information and a submission of the case, stated
particulars constituting an offense other than or
different from that charged in the information 1 and
no leave asked and none ~ranted~ to permit an
amended informatio:n, and as. heretofore urg~ed, an
amended information could not even be granted substituting one offense for another.

IV.
ASSIGNMENTS 12 AND 13
The court erred in admitting p!laintiff's Exhibit A.
and in p·ermitting the witness Pearson to tes.tify
as to the financial condition of the corporation.
We will group together Assignments Nos. 12 and
13, covering the above errors. Exhibit A purports
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to be a report of the financial condition of Hill
Bros. Alfalfa Milling Comp~any as, of June 30, 1939.
It was compiled by Mr. Pearson, \vho at the time
of trial, ,,. .as a bank teller at Nephi. From July,
1~138, until the tir:St of June, 193.9, when Hill Bros
Alfalfa Milling Con1pany was organized, Pearson
\vas in the employ of Hill Brothers as bookkeeper
(Tr. :.28). From June 1, 1939, until about the 20th
of August, 1939, he continued as bookkeeper for
the corporation and "\vas also secretary-treasurer of
the corporation ( Tr. 28-29). ·V\7ho Hill Brothers
were is not shown. The only reference \Ve have to
any such parties is the statement of the 'vitness
Pearson that he \Vas bookkeeper for them. No
presumption can be indulged in that the defendant
was one of them. As secretarv-treasurer of the
corporation, Pearson was supposed to keep the
books and get out financial statements. The first
sheet in the report is the balance sheet, the next is
the profit and loss statement, and the last shows
.how the money was spent. The report was made
some time in July and was intended to show something of the affairs of the comp·any as of June 30,
1939, as will be shown by the sheet bearing the signature of Pearson (Tr. 30).
Certain items, towit, machinery and equipment,
buildings and land, are shown under fixed asset~
on the first sheet of the report. Just how the valuation of those items was arrived at was not determined (Tr. 32).
.

u

This report, over objection of the defendant . was
received in evidence; the witness was then asked,
"Now, what was the financial condition of the company on July the 31st, 1939, in comp~arison to this
date of June 30, 1939, when this statement wa.s gott~n out?" to which the witness replied that it was
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better July 31st than it "\vas June 30th by between
six and ei.ght hundred dollars.
The books of the corporation were not produced,
although they were in the possession of the sheriff
of Millard County.
Exhibit A was erroneously admitte_d for several
reasons. In the first p~laceJ the financial condition
of Hill Bros . Alfalfa !1illing Company was not an
issue. There had been no claim at that time that
there ha.d been any representation as to the financial standing of the corporation. The only issue
was as to the rep·resentations made and financial
condition of the defendant personally.
Next, the prop~er foundation was not laid for the
admission of Exhibit A. ·we believe it is elementary that before books. of account can be admitted
that it must be shown tha.t they vlere correctly kept
and that the items in there are true, and that they
are relevant to the issue.
An account book of original entries, fair on its. face
and shown to have been kept in the usual coursA
of business, is admissible in evidence in favor of the
party by whom it is kep·t. Ordinarily a person's
books of account cannot be used as evidence up1on
issues betw-een thitfd persons. The entries in such
books as to third pers·ons are res inter alios .acta
and may not be introduced unless a foundation is
laid for their admission on special grounds.
10 R. C. L. 1176.
In Notes 53 L. R. A. 513,
the annotator says that the general rule is that a
person's books of account cannot be l!Sed as evidence upon issues between third persons ; that entries in such books as to such third p~ersons are res
inter alios acta and cannot he used a.gains~t persons not parties to them. Citing cases.
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The corporation, Hill Bros . ..:-\.lfalfa 1\Iilling Company, is not a party to this action. The books and
records of the corporation themselves could not be
put in eYidence against the defendant Hill. Nor is
it sho,,-n that he '"as a party to or connected with
the transactions concerning the entries of the books
of the corporation. If the books of the corporation
"Tere not then1selves admissible in evidence, then it
is clear that no copy or statement of the books would
be admissible. Thoug-h the defendant Hill had been
a party to or connected -v.Tith the transactions concerning the entries of the books and the statement
made from the books and p·ut in evidence, still the
hooks or the statement "rould be inadmissible, for·
that to be- admissible in any case and as.. stated in
a leading case.
Radtke v. Taylor, 105 Ore. 559; 210 P·ac
863.
and particularly,
27 A. L. R. 1423,
the books must appear to have been honestly kept, .
that they must be books of original entry, that thP
entries must have been made in the regular cours.e
of the entrant's business or employment, that the
entries must have been fairly contemporaneous
with the transactions entered, that the entrant must
verify the correctness of the books, or his absence he
account0d for and that the- entrant must know of
his O"\\TJl knowledge the truth of the transaction which
he enters or his testimony he sup·p·lemented hy one
having knowledge. None of these requirements
·were shown, nor indeed "\vas there any foundation
laid for the admissibility of the books jn evidence,
or with respect to a statement made from the books,
or what books or the nature or character thereof
that were examined by the author making the
statement, or as to 'vha.t knowledge he had of or
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concerning the nature or character of the hooks examined by him.
It \Va~ from this report, Exhibit A, that the court
concluded that the defendant had made fals,e statements concerning the financial condition of the corporation at the time the hay in question \Vas purchased. Without this ·report, there was no evidence
of any kind whatever as to the financial condition
of the corporation. Manif~stly, the ad1nission of
<this evidence vvas prejudicial to the defendant.
What has been said of Exhibit A applies also to
the question asked \yi tness Pearson as to the financial condition of the .company as of July 31, 1939.
There are other errors assigned relating to the admission of evidence, especially in admitting the
testimony of Mr .. Crafts, Assignment of Error 16,
and Rulon Hinckley, Frank Roberts and Peter Gronning, Assignment o£ Error 17. These witnesses
testified to what the defendant s.aid to them in
October, 1939, concerning the financial condition of
the company on July 31i 1939, '"·hen the hay was
purchased. This evidence waR offered on the theory
tha.t it was an admission by the defendant. As \Ve
have heretofore said~ the financial condition of the
corporation was not in issue and .anything· said con~erning the financial condition of the corporation
wa.s irrelevant and immaterial. Further, the corpu~
delecti had not been proven and never was proven :
hence, the admission of thi~ testimony was plainly
error.
For the manifest reasons stated in this brief, the
case should be reversed with directions that the
:samP should be dismissed and thP- defendant
released.
Respectfully submitted,

WILLARD HANSON,
Attorney for Appellant.
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